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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1989, same-sex couples in Europe and North America have begun to
receive many or all of the rights and responsibilities of legal marriage. To date,
nine European countries give same-sex couples either the right to marry (the
Netherlands and Belgium) or to form a legal partner relationship (registered
partnerships in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland; pactes civil
de solidarite in France; and life partnerships in Germany). Several Canadian
provinces and territories now extend such rights, with federal legislation under
active consideration. In the United States, Massachusetts grants same-sex
couples the right to marry. California, Vermont and Connecticut provide almost
all of the state-granted rights and responsibilities of marriage. New Jersey,
Maine, and Hawaii provide same-sex couples with a smaller package of such
rights. In several other countries and states, marriage and partnership rights
legislation is scheduled to go into effect (the United Kingdom and New
Zealand), or appear likely to be enacted (Spain, Luxembourg, and Switzerland).
This remarkable movement toward legal equality for gay and lesbian
couples raises many intriguing questions. In particular, it forces us to wonder
why some countries have moved so clearly toward equality while others have
not. This question has both academic and political significance. Academically,
this phenomenon poses a new challenge for scholars of comparative public
policy and social movements (especially as these rights expand beyond the
Scandinavian countries, with their reputation for egalitarian social policy).
Unlike social welfare policy or policies related to unions, for instance,
partnership recognition policies are not broadly redistributive in the sense that
one social group gains at the expense of another.' But this is not merely a
t Associate Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
1. However, a few commentators have argued that giving same-sex couples partnership rights in
Scandinavia and the Netherlands caused direct harm to children through a drop-off in heterosexual
marriage and an increase in nonmarital births. See Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/
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cultural shift, either. After all, marriage is an economic institution insofar as it
confers rights to concrete, material benefits and comes with contractual
provisions that may alter individuals' incentives regarding childbearing, labor
force participation, and other kinds of economic behavior. But, because most
of those effects are rooted in potentially redistributive obligations within the
couple rather than redistribution at the social level, expansion of marriage
rights is not a zero-sum game.2
Understanding the position of the United States in the international context
is also a recurring academic issue in comparative analysis. At a time of
accelerating international recognition of same-sex couples, the United States
appears as something of an outlier given the unwillingness of the federal
government to recognize same-sex couples and the current debate about an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would reserve marriage only for
different-sex couples. However, rather than claiming a new form of "American
exceptionalism," I would argue that American states, rather than the United
States as a whole, would be the appropriate units to compare to the European
experience. If this is the case, then explanations of change at the country level
in Europe might also be useful for explaining or predicting change at the state
level in the United States. The primary goal of this paper is explore this
possibility.
On a political level, understanding why some countries have been
successful in expanding marriage rights for gay couples can be useful in several
ways. With limited resources of human effort and financial backing, national
gay rights organizations might prefer to be selective in taking on the marriage
battle in particular states, and a greater understanding of these processes of
change might help national groups to better select those targets. Furthermore,
identification of key social and political dynamics might help activists develop
strategies for gaining allies and neutralizing opposition.
In this Article, I attempt to expand our understanding of why and where
legal change occurs by taking theories and evidence from Europe and applying
public/articles/000/000/003/660zypwj.asp (Last visited Apr. 6, 2005); M. van Mourik et al., Good for
Gays, Bad for Marriage, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 11, 2004, at A16. Others have argued that Kurtz's and
van Mourik's arguments fail several logical and empirical tests. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Darren R.
Spedale, & Hans Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2004), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4
(last visited Apr. 18, 2005). Also, the trends they cite as evidence for the harm to marriage were present
long before same-sex couples were given marriage or partnership rights. M. V. Lee Badget, Will
Providing Marriage Rights to Same-Sex Couples Undermine Heterosexual Marriage?, I SEXUALITY
RES. & SOC. POL'Y: J. OF NSRC (2004); Joop Garssen & M. V. Lee Badgett, Equality Doesn't Harm
'Family Values,' NATIONAL POST, Aug. 11, 2004, at Al 6.
2. There does not appear to have been much concern about the potential fiscal impact of granting
these rights in European countries. In the United States, by contrast, opponents of same-sex marriage
have raised concerns about the cost to state and federal budgets, although the actual likely impact is
positive. See M. V. Lee Badgett & R. Bradley Sears, Putting a Price on Equality? The Impact of




them to the United States. In the next Part, I describe two closely related
theories by which legal scholars have attempted to explain the spread of same-
sex partner recognition. Those theories highlight the importance of building on
success and offer clear predictions for which countries and which states would
be most likely to expand marriage rights to include same-sex couples. In the
third Part, I offer an alternative theoretical framework that combines insights
from recent work in economics and political science. This framework proposes
several possible forces that promote change, highlighting those factors that
related empirical work (summarized in that section) isolates as apparently being
the most important in explaining change in Europe. The fourth Part presents
and compares predictions of the two alternative theoretical perspectives in the
United States. I assess which framework would have best predicted existing
same-sex couple rights, arguing that my alternative framework explains U.S.
changes at least as well as the incrementalist approach preferred by legal
scholars.
II. THEORIES OF CHANGE, PART 1: BUILDING ON SUCCESS
Most of the English-language scholarship on European same-sex
partnership and marriage laws has come from legal scholars, focusing only on
the legal effect rather than the causal roots of such laws. 3 Dutch law professor
Kees Waaldijk goes beyond that focus to offer a "law of small change" to
account for the passage of same-sex partner recognition laws in Europe.4 Over
time, he observes, European countries have gradually, steadily, and for the
most part sequentially liberalized laws that place gay men and lesbians in a
second-class position. Professor Waaldijk outlines a common path or "standard
sequence" that starts with decriminalizing sodomy and then moves on to
equalizing the age of consent for same-sex sexual relationships, enacting anti-
discrimination legislation, and finally addressing partnership and parenting
differences. Each step in the sequence stimulates the next i n a 1 og c t ha
generates momentum for change. Opposition to change may be defused
because the legislative change is perceived as being small at each step.
Alternatively, the small change might deliberately leave some inequality that
serves the purpose of "reinforc[ing] the condemnation of homosexuality."
5
Leaving some inequality officially reinscribes the unequal status of gay and
3. For two very useful and informative collections of articles on different countries, see LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN EUROPE (Katharina Boele-Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds.,
2003) [hereinafter Boele-Woelki & Fuchs]; LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Wintemute & Andenaesl.
4. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in Wintemute & Andenaes, supra note 3, at 437.
5. Id. at 440.
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lesbian people in the law, but. Waaldijk argues that some progress makes it
easier to move to a new level by facilitating an "orderly and reasonable"
discussion: "In such an orderly discussion, it could more easily be established
that there is hardly a reasonable argument against it.'
6
Waaldijk uses the example of the Netherlands to show how the "law of
small change" worked as Dutch law moved gay couples closer to full equality
with heterosexual couples. First, over time the Netherlands granted a set of
rights related to rent and tax laws that applied to both cohabiting same-sex and
different-sex couples. 7 As these laws accumulated, however, the treatment of
same-sex couples remained obviously unequal since only heterosexual couples
had the right to marry. Second, in 1998 the Dutch parliament created a new
registered partnership status with an expanded set of rights (including
inheritance rights, property and other tax rights equivalent to those embodied in
legal marriage) that was available to all unmarried couples-same-sex and
different-sex-who formally registered their relationship. But marriage itself
remained the privilege of heterosexual couples, and registered partnerships
were not completely equivalent to marriage. For instance, the law left out
pension and immigration rights for registered partners. Waaldijk describes a
series of subsequent "small changes" that narrowed those remaining differences
between partnership and marriage over time.8 Finally, when the Netherlands
opened legal marriage to same-sex couples, the jump from registered
partnerships was perceived as small. But, Waaldijk's principle was still evident
since the legislation did not adjust the statutory presumption that the husband of
a woman who gives birth is the legal parent of a child, leaving the lesbian
partner of a woman who gives birth with no automatic full parental status
(although she can later adopt the child).9
William N. Eskridge, Jr., presents a more nuanced theory that, like
Waaldijk's framework, links successes over time but that also fills in the gaps
between legal changes with a political and social dynamic that propels
change.10 An incremental path of legal developments allows for a gradual
change in public opinion through improvement of attitudes toward gay people
within age cohorts and through the replacement of older homophobic cohorts
by younger cohorts who are less homophobic. The changed social and legal
environment prompts more openness by lesbian and gay people as well as more
political organizing (which is also facilitated by increased openness).
Openness and political mobilization provide more information about gay
people that then contributes to the falsification of stereotypes that allege that
6. Id. at 453.
7. Wintemute & Andenaes supra note 3, app. I at 777.
8. Waaldijk supra note 4, at 450-51.
9. See Waaldijk supra note 4, app. III at 457.




equality will generate negative social effects. With the dismantling of
stereotypes, more legal change is then possible, and the links between political
participation, attitude change, and stereotype erosion lead to a process that
reinforces the legal cycle and, it would seem, accelerates change over time.
While these two astute scholars of marriage law offer important
observations about the process of change, it is important to question closely
such accounts that imply the inevitability of change. Many historians of
sexuality note that historical "progress" in tolerance of homosexuality is not
linear. Trends toward tolerance have reversed course at various points in
history." Not surprisingly, the incrementalists offer no clear idea about how
long each incremental step should or will take.
However, each step might require significant political mobilization and
could generate increasing practical and symbolic opposition. In their study of
U.S. battles over sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, Marieka Klawitter
and Brian Hammer argue that a compromise half-way position might be a
consolation prize rather than a step in the direction of continued change. 2 The
political backlash against the Massachusetts Goodridge v. Department of
Health decision in the United States has led President George W. Bush to
support and the U.S. Congress to consider the Federal Marriage Amendment,
which would create an enormous barrier to granting rights to same-sex couples.
In the international context, Denmark has gradually equalized registered
partnerships with marriage, but the barrier to marriage per se remains in place
sixteen years after the implementation of registered partnerships. 13
Furthermore, seeing change as part of an almost deterministic dynamic begs the
question of why a country would ever begin this process of recognizing same-
sex couples. Presumably changes in marriage laws would be related to
whatever factors prompted the initial rethinking of all policies related to
homosexuality, such as increased political mobilization of gay people or
changing cultural norms about sexuality.
Finally, the law of small change and its variant seem in some ways more
like a political-legislative strategy for the gay and lesbian social movement than
the inexorable process as presented by Waaldijk and by Eskridge.14 The idea of
building on success necessarily ties changes in marriage laws to prior successes
of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender social movement. Connections to
larger demographic trends or non-gay political struggles (such as those around
11. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1980); JOHN
BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994); GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW X ORK:
GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940 (1994).
12. Marieka Klawitter & Brian Hammer, Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Local
Antidiscrimination Policies for Sexual Orientation, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS (Ellen D.B. Riggle & Barry L. Tadlock eds., 1999).
13. Ingrid Lund-Andersen, The Danish Registered Partnership Act, in Boele-Woelki & Fuchs
supra note 3, at 23.
14. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 114.
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family leave or child care, for instance) are missing, however. Granted,
Waaldijk and Eskridge acknowledge the importance of thinking about broader
social characteristics that might contribute to some nations' more progressive
policy orientation toward gay couples, but those characteristics form only the
background in their central dynamic that drives change.
III. THEORIES OF CHANGE, PART 2: CONDITIONS FOR CHANGE
An alternative approach to understanding the expansion of marriage rights
to include same-sex couples (either through marriage or through a new status)
comes from theoretical and empirical work on institutions in economics,
political science, and sociology. In a recent paper, I have proposed two
possible motivations for legal recognition of same-sex couples: (1) enhancing
social and economic efficiency for couples and society; and (2) resolving social
conflicts in favor of more powerful groups who want to recognize same-sex
couples. 15 Here I summarize those propositions.
Efficiency motivations for change: Economists from many traditions argue
that the legal institution of marriage promotes efficiency at the social level and
at the family level by promoting the specialization of labor within the
household, 16 by encouraging economies of scale,' 7 by reducing transaction
costs, 1 and by encouraging the utilization of caring labor. 19 As a result of
these advantages, couples and societies have an incentive to develop and
expand this efficiency-enhancing institution. Same-sex couples, especially
those couples with property or children, would have a material incentive to
seek this status, in addition to any other customary benefits of being married.20
Happier, healthier, and richer couples and children will thereby contribute to a
more productive economy and society, giving policymakers an incentive to
15. See M. V. Lee Badgett, Variations on an Equitable Theme: Explaining International Same-Sex
Partner Recognition Laws, in INSTITUT NATIONAL D'ETUDES DEMOGRAPHIQUES, DOCUMENTS DE
TRAVAIL NO. 124, Same-sex couples, same-sex partnerships & homosexual marriage: A focus on cross-
national differentials, (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy, eds., 2003), available at http://www-same-
sex.ined.fr/publica.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
16. GARY S. BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).
17. Julie A. Nelson, Household Economies of Scale in Consumption: Theory and Evidence, 46
ECONOMETRICA 1301 (1988).
18. Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. OF ECON.
LITERATURE 581 (1985).
19. Nancy Folbre, 'Holding Hands at Midnight': The Paradox of Caring Labor, FEMINIST ECON.
73 (1995).
20. For instance, in many countries married couples receive survivor rights in public pensions or
spousal coverage in private health care benefit provision. See KEES WAALDIJK, MORE OR LESS
TOGETHER: LEVELS OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE, COHABITATION AND REGISTERED
PARTNERSHIP FOR DIFFERENT-SEX AND SAME-SEX PARTNERS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 9 (2005), available at http://www.ined.fr/publications/collections/
dossiersetrecherches/1 25.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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adopt a Pareto-improving modification to existing law that would give more
couples access to such an important status.
2 1
Thus recognition of same-sex couples could be explained in several ways.
First, as same-sex couples become more visible socially and more vocal
politically about their need for marriage, policymakers may alter formal
institutions to accommodate these newly identified needs. Second, and with a
very different effect, if marriage becomes less efficiency-enhancing, as when
certain European welfare states have taken over some traditional
responsibilities of the family, then policymakers might see less of a need for
expanding marriage rights to same-sex couples, and same-sex couples
themselves might see less of a need for those rights. In that case, efficiency
considerations might reduce the likelihood of opening up marriage to same-sex
couples. However, efficiency concerns will still favor opening up marriage as
long as it continues to improve couples' well-being, as when the state
privileges married couples in some ways (e.g. waiving inheritance taxes) or
when the contractual components of marriage are useful for couples (e.g. rules
for the division of property when a marriage ends).
Conflict and power explanations: Other social scientists propose that
institutions are less the outcome of a competitive struggle for efficiency than an
outcome of social and political bargaining. In this view, more powerful groups
are able to shape institutions that serve their own political and economic
22interests. And since institutions are shaped by internal conflict and relative
power, then any larger collective value of the institutions is accidental rather
than intentional. Further, conflict and power will influence both the institutions
themselves and the rules of access to those institutions. That is, both the legal
and social meanings of marriage and the rules governing who can marry will be
shaped by political competition.
An opening of access to marriage for same-sex couples could be related to
three key factors in this framework. First, if some countries have people with
more liberal attitudes toward homosexuality, or if those attitudes become more
liberal over time, we would expect to see a greater likelihood that the country
would give same-sex couples marriage rights. Second, if groups favoring
rights for gay couples gain in political power, then recognition of those rights
would be more likely. The rising power of left political parties, increasing
influence of gay social movement organizations, or declining influence of
21. For a review of several studies in the United States that suggest that the fiscal impact of
marriage or marriage-like rights and responsibilities for same-sex couples actually tips in the state's
favor, see Badgett & Sears, supra note 2.
22. JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992); Daron Acemoglu, Root Causes: A
Historical Approach to Assessing the Role of Institutions in Economic Development, in FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT 27-30 (June 2003); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, Reversal of
Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q. J.
OF ECON. 1231-94 (2002); Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Political Losers as a Barrier to
Economic Development, 90 AM.. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 126-30 (2000).
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religious organizations would all make laws recognizing same-sex couples
more likely. 23 A third conflict-oriented access route is related to efficiency
concerns. The declining material importance of marriage could improve the
likelihood that states will recognize same-sex couples, perhaps because there
would be less resistance to changing an institution that is viewed as less
important than it once was. Countries that provide individual-based benefits,
such as health insurance, might have a lower value of marriage than places like
the United States, where marriage is an important route to health insurance
coverage.
24
Some differences between this broader context of efficiency and conflict
concerns and the approaches of Eskridge and Waaldijk are important to note.
First, the framework outlined here contains contradictory hypotheses rather
than a building-on-success type of dynamic, e.g. same-sex marriage is more
likely when marriage comes with economically valuable benefits but is also
less likely when benefits are provided through marriage. The point of this
conceptual exercise is to broaden the possible explanatory stories rather than to
identify the precise culprits in shaping social change. Developing a deeper
sense of the European dynamic requires empirical testing of some of these
possible causal routes of change. Second, this theoretical framework highlights
the roles of some of the same factors that Waaldijk and Eskridge have noted in
the passage of same-sex partnership and marriage laws, such as religiosity, the
importance of marriage, and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.
As a test of the relative importance of efficiency and conflict factors, I
created and gathered measures that correspond to the different compopmts
mentioned in the discussion of the broader theoretical framework.25  Using
these measures, I use two analytical techniques to identify which factors predict
23. Other observers have focused on these potential routes of change, including Waaldijk and
Eskridge. Political scientists studying the passage of gay-related laws in the United States find mixed
support for some of these influences. Some studies find that proxies for attitudes toward lesbian and gay
people, such as high education or urbanization, are associated with gay-positive policy outcomes
actions. E.g., Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, The States and the Differing Impetus for Divergent Paths
on Same-Sex Marriage, 1990-2001, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 331 (2003); Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth
J. Meier, The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: Expanding the Scope of the Conflict, 58 J. POL. 332
(1996); Donald P. Haider-Markel, Mark R. Joslyn & Chad J. Kniss, Minority Group Interests and
Political Representation: Gay Elected Officials in the Policy Process, in 62 J. POL. 568 (2000). Places
with more members of gay rights organizations have a higher likelihood of gay-positive outcomes.
Barclay & Fisher infra; Haider-Markel & Meier infra. In some cases higher measures of religiosity
reduce the likelihood of pro-gay positions. Haider-Markel & Meier infra; Kenneth D. Wald, James W.
Button, & Barbara A. Rienzo, The Politics of Gay Rights in American Communities: Explaining
Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, in 40 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1152 (1996); Gregory B. Lewis,
Contentious and Consensus Gay Rights Issues: Public Opinion and State Laws on Discrimination and
Same-Sex Marriage, Presented at Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Meetings in
Washington D.C. (Nov. 6-8, 2003).
24. Eighty percent of non-elderly insured people in the United States receive coverage through their
own employment or through the employment-based health insurance of a family member. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P60-220, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
25. For more details on these measures, see Badgett supra note 1, at 101-03.
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the passage and implementation of a law recognizing same-sex partners (or
SSPR for same-sex partner recognition law) for twenty-six OECD countries
from 1989-2004, including all nine with SSPR laws in effect in 2004. Many of
the measures, including attitudes toward homosexuality, attitudes toward
marriage, and cohabitation rates, come from the 1990-93 wave of the World
Values Surveys.
26
The empirical models included a variety of country-level measures.
Efficiency-related measures captured the value of marriage (state expenditures
on social welfare programs as a percentage of GDP, cohabitation rates of
heterosexual couples, divorce rates, and attitudes toward marriage), the
visibility of same-sex couples (proxied by the visibility of commercial
establishments oriented toward the gay community as captured by a gay
business index), attitudes toward homosexuality (percentage of country's
respondents reporting that they would not want to have a homosexual
neighbor), political power of gay and lesbian people and potential allies (union
density, an index of gay organizations, the existence and persistence of a
national gay and lesbian political organization, and the existence of a left
government for at least two years), and the size of potential religious opponents
to partnership rights (percentage of residents with frequent church attendance).
Two different methods for identifying predictors of an SSPR law, one
quantitative and one more qualitative method, produce consistent findings. In
the quantitative regression analysis, SSPR laws are found in countries with
higher heterosexual cohabitation rates, more tolerant attitudes toward
homosexuality, higher social expenditures, and higher gay organizational
density. Other factors with the expected effects on SSPR laws-lower
religiosity and the presence of a left government-are not statistically
significant, however. A second technique, known as qualitative comparative
analysis, 27 reveals that all nine SSPR countries have low religiosity, high
cohabitation, and high tolerance for homosexuality. In addition to those three
characteristics, many of the nine countries also have either high social welfare
expenditures or high gay organization or gay business index values.
Overall, the findings from the empirical analysis suggest that gay and
lesbian visibility is greater in countries recognizing same-sex partners, that
support for tolerance of homosexuality is higher, and that political power of
gay-rights allies is stronger and gay-rights opponents is weaker in countries
with SSPR laws. The importance of high heterosexual cohabitation rates seems
26. RONALD INGLEHART, ET AL., WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1990-93 (2000) (both of these surveys
are conducted periodically, but only the most recent publication date is given).
27. See CHARLES C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD: MOVING BEYOND QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES (1987). Ragin and others have developed Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA) to allow for studies with that are larger than typical case studies but smaller than the large
samples necessary for regression analysis. QCA is designed both to capture parsimoniously the
important qualitative details of a case and to operationalize the idea that causal conditions tend to occur
together in groups.
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to undermine the efficiency perspective, in which the low value of marriage
implied by heterosexual couples' decisions to avoid marriage would reducc the
likelihood of an SSPR law.
It is difficult but interesting, however, to consider exactly what the
cohabitation-SSPR link implies. The heterosexual cohabitation rate is possibly
a proxy for the presence of same-sex couples, in which case this variable picks
up visibility of gay and lesbian couples-an efficiency-related effect. In the
United States, the correlation between the percentage of cohabiting
heterosexual couples and the proportion of same-sex couples is large and
positive,2 8 for instance, but we do not have such figures for same-sex couples in
European countries. Other interpretations of the cohabitation variable, on the
other hand, suggest a conflict perspective. Heterosexual couples who "vote
with their feet" against marriage must see marriage as a less valuable institution
than married heterosexual couples, so perhaps policymakers find less resistance
to giving same-sex couples some or all marriage rights where many people see
an attractive alternative to marriage. Alternatively, policymakers in countries
with cohabitors might see value in official recognition of many family forms,
including unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex couples. As evidence
of this effect, note that cohabitating different-sex couples receive many of the
positive and negative legal consequences of marriage in the SSPR countries.2
9
Or perhaps the changes that same-sex couples build on are not changes related
to gay issues, as Waaldijk argues, but changes related to family recognition.
That is, once countries give rights to different-sex unmarried couples, perhaps
extending that particular package of rights to same-sex couples is a small,
manageable, or relatively uncontroversial step.
IV. APPLYING MODELS OF CHANGE TO THE UNITED STATES
An alternative test of these two contrasting approaches to explaining social
change would be to see how well they explain existing patterns in the United
States and to follow the relative success of the frameworks' respective
predictions over time. Below I make predictions based on the two frameworks
using data on the fifty states. I then compare those two sets of predictions to
see how well each predicts the current state of the law with respect to
partnership rights in the U.S.
Seven states provide (or will soon provide) at least some legal rights to
same-sex couples who register their relationship with the state. Only
28. Author's calculation from Census data in TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE & UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 13-14 tbl. 6 (2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
29. According to a recent report, the percentage of marital rights and responsibilities for cohabiting
different-sex partners ranges from 23% in Germany to 75% in the Netherlands and Sweden. WAALDIJK
supra note 20, at 51.
[Vol. 17:71
Predicting Partnership Rights
Massachusetts allows same-sex couples to marry. Vermont, Connecticut, and
California offer a civil union or domestic partnership status to same-sex
couples that comes with all (Vermont and Connecticut) or almost all
(California) of the state-granted rights and responsibilities of marriage. Three
other states offer more limited packages of rights for same-sex couples who
register with the state as "reciprocal beneficiaries" (Hawaii) or domestic
partners (New Jersey and Maine).30
A "building on success" approach in the American context would predict
expanded partnership rights in states that had already acted to give equal rights
in other contexts to gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. As Waaldijk suggests,
laws making discrimination in employment illegal typically precede the
granting of partnership rights. 31 The left-hand column of Table 1, infra, lists
the sixteen states (including the District of Columbia) that currently forbid
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, in order of the year of
passage. 32 The six states in bold type currently recognize same-sex couples in
some way, as noted in the above paragraph. Of these states, only Maine does
not currently outlaw employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The fact that the six states with same-sex partnership recognition were also
among the first seven states to pass nondiscrimination laws supports the
building-on-success theory, since we would expect the states with the longest
history of supporting the principle of equal treatment in employment for gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people to be the first to move on the marriage or
partnership issue.
A "conditions for change" approach in the United States is more
complicated to calculate. I use state-level measures of the three key necessary
conditions for change found in my earlier paper: relatively high heterosexual
cohabitation rates, relatively low religiosity, and relatively high tolerance of
homosexuality. While the measures are somewhat different from those used in
the international context, the relative uniformity of data collected in the United
States presents the opportunity to use variables more closely related to the
concepts identified in the theoretical framework:
30. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT MARRIAGE EQUALITY 17-18
(undated), available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=GetInvolvedl &Template=/Content
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=17262 (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). For Connecticut, see
Daniela Altimari, A Gay Rights Milestone: Rell Signs Civil Unions Bill; Opponents Call it a Sad Day,
HARTFORD COURANT, April 21, 2005, http://www.courant.com/news/local/hc-
civilunion042 l.artapr21,0,1357108,print.storycoll=hc-big-headlines-breaking, acc 4/21/05.
31. This relationship is not strictly observed in Europe, however. Both Germany and Belgium
passed laws granting partnership rights before they passed nondiscrimination laws. See Kees Waaldijk,
Towards the Recognition of Same-Sex Partners in European Union Law: Expectations Based on Trends
in National Law, in Wintemute & Andenaes supra note 3, at 635, 638, and app. at 649.
32. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 30 (2003), available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=20042&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentlD= 18678 (last visited Apr. 18, 2005); S.B. 3186, 93d Gen. Assem. (I11. 2004) (enacted).
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* Heterosexual cohabitation rates come from Census 2000,
calculated as the proportion of different-sex couples who classify
themselves as "unmarried partners."
33
" As a state-level measure of tolerance, I use state-level tolerance
measures calculated by Gregory Lewis from several surveys that
ask about the morality of homosexual behavior or whether
homosexual acts should be legal or not;
34
* For the religiosity measure, I calculate the proportion of the state's
population who are adherents (members, their children, and other
nonmember participants) of evangelical churches from the 2000
Religious Congregations and Membership survey of religious
bodies, conducted by the Association of Statisticians of Religious
Bodies.
35
For each measure, I calculate the average state value and assign a subscore
of one for each of the following conditions: above average cohabitation rates,
above average tolerance measures, and below average proportions of
evangelical residents.36 I add the three subscores to get the overall score, which
ranges from zero to three. Scores and underlying measures are reported in
Table 2, infra.
The second column of Table 1 shows the twenty states with scores of three,
indicating that they have relative measures of cohabitation, tolerance, and
religiosity that would make them most like the -European countries that
recognize rights for same-sex partners. Like the building-on-success models,
the conditions-for-change framework predicts six out of seven states with
existing partnership laws, with New Jersey the exception this time because of
its relatively low rate of heterosexual cohabitation.
Overall, one might note that the two sets of states significantly overlap.
However, New Jersey, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Illinois show up in group
33. SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 28, at 4.
34. Lewis, supra note 23.
35. The survey data were collected by Dale E. Jones, Sherri Doty, Clifford Grammich, James E.
Horsch, Richard Houseal, Mac Lynn, John P. Marcum, Kenneth M. Sanchagrin and Richard H. Taylor.
This data forms the basis of Dale E. Jones et. al., Evangelical Denominations-Total Adherents (2000),
in RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: AN ENUMERATION BY
REGION, STATE AND COUNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED FOR 149 RELIGIOUS BODIES. My data was
drawn from a United States map associated with this project, which is available at
http://www.thearda.com/arda.asp?Show=RCMS2000 (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
36. One known omission in these data is several large African-American churches and the National
Baptist Convention. Since some of these groups might be considered "evangelical", the measure used in
this paper will underestimate the proportion of a state's population that adheres to an evangelical
religion. However, to the extent that these missing evangelicals would be more likely to live in the
states that have high proportions of reported evangelicals, the comparison used in this paper would not
be very sensitive to the omissions. That is, the focus here is on states with low proportions of
evangelicals relative to the average, so the relative position of those states is not likely to change. See
Jones, supra note 35. This page is also available at
http://www.glenmary.org/grc/RCMS_2000/method.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
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one but not group two.37 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Maine,
Michigan, Oregon, and Washington show up in group two but not group one.
To break the current "tie" between the two frameworks' predictions, we will
need to follow future events in these states.
However, two other comparisons offer sneak previews. First, state courts
in Washington State38 and New York39 have recently ruled favorably on the
principle of equal marriage rights. 40 Second, at least one other state currently
appears close to achieving some form of recognition for same-sex couples.
This year the Maryland General Assembly passed a bill establishing a domestic
partner registry that gives partners rights for medical decision-making, which
now awaits the governor's signature or veto. 4 1  Of these three states, only
Washington does not meet the building-on-success criterion of a
nondiscrimination law, but the conditions-for-change framework predicts that
all three states, including Washington, would be likely candidates for some
form of legal recognition of same-sex couples. Finally, note that Maryland (in
2001) and New York (in 2004) are fairly recent additions to the list of states
with nondiscrimination protections, suggesting that the time required for
building-on-success is variable and nonspecific enough to be a relatively poor
guide as to timing of passage of partnership laws.
One final possibility is to combine the two approaches. Recalculating the
scores by adding one when a state has a nondiscrimination law results in a
shorter list of predictions. Six of the seven states with existing partner laws get
the highest score: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont. Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin also get the highest score, suggesting that they would be prime
targets for same-sex marriage advocates. But the ability to predict the states
with existing laws and to predict those that seem poised to recognize same-sex
partners is no better than either framework alone.
In summary, the conditions-for-change framework provides a slightly
better fit to actual and likely future legal recognition of same-sex couples than
does the building-on-success framework. Each framework's predictions
37. The District of Columbia is not included in the conditions-for-change predictions because no
data on DC was provided by Lewis.
38. Andersen v. King Country, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4,
2004), appeal argued (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005).
39. Hemandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004, slip op. 25057 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005),
transferred to N.Y. App. Div., 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 752 (Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005) (Mo. No. 225 SSD 11).
40. A 1998 Alaska decision also seemed to pave the way for same-sex couples to marry in a state
singled out by the conditions-for-change approach, but a subsequent referendum to amend the state
constitution stopped that effort. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). See ESKRIDGE supra note 10, at 40-42.
41. Md. Sen. Bill 796, 2005 Gen. Assem., 420th Reg. Sess., available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2005rs/bills/sb/sb0796f.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). Sumathi Reddy, Fight
Persists on Medical Decisions, BALT. SUN, Apr. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ocal/politics/bal-
md.domestic 13apr13,1,4039365.story?ctrack=2&cset=true (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
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correctly include six out of the seven existing states with a partnership or
marriage law that includes same-sex couples and two of the three states that
may be moving toward such a law. The conditions-for-change model would
edge ahead slightly in the scorecard if Washington were to allow same-sex
couples to marry as a result of the pending litigation there.
V. CONCLUSION
One possible conclusion from the overlapping predictions of the two
theoretical frameworks is that they overlap conceptually as well. The tolerance
and religiosity measures highlighted by the conditions-for-change argument
could also help explain the existence of a nondiscrimination law. And if the
contribution of the cohabitation measure is that it is correlated with the number
of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people in a state, or perhaps the number of
feminist heterosexual women who do not want to marry, then cohabitation
likely picks up a political power effect. In that case, we might interpret the
building-on-success model as simply nested within a larger political or social
movements framework (similar to the conditions-for-change model) that
explains the success of the gay rights movement in general. But if the
cohabitation rate captures some family-policy-specific aspect of social conflict,
such as a lower economic value of marriage or an acceptance of a broader
definition of family in a given state-as cohabitation might imply in the
European situation-then the two frameworks appear much more distinct.
As political and judicial battles evolve over same-sex marriage and other
forms of recognition for same-sex couples, the value of these conceptual
frameworks for understanding that process will become more clear. In the
meantime, broadening our thinking about important political precursors to
same-sex marriage may still be useful. One important strategic question
concerns the order of change. An incrementalist approach suggests that test
cases and legislative efforts to gain rights for same-sex couples should focus on
states that already have nondiscrimination laws. In this view, taking on the
partnership issue in states that do not have nondiscrimination laws might run
the risk of failure and a backlash that will make future changes more difficult.
The more expansive theoretical approach sketched out in this article wnuld
argue that other factors related to the social conditions in a given state might be
at least as relevant. Those conditions might be more likely to be present where
a gay, lesbian, and bisexual political movement has already emerged and has
won some battles. This broader contextual approach is at least as good as the
incrementalist framework for predicting change, providing an alternative
understanding as to why some states are more amenable to change than others.
The broader cultural factors appear to add information about the social and
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political context that both lawyers and political activists should consider while
plotting strategies.
Transferring political lessons and experiences from one continent to
another runs the risk of ignoring important cultural or social differences
between countries and continents. In the context of efforts to gain recognition
for same-sex partners, however, the general structure of experiences in Europe
maps fairly well onto the United States-so far, at least.
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TABLE 1: PREDICTIONS OF STATE ADOPTION OF PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES






New Jersey (1992) Delaware
Vermont (1992) Florida
Minnesota (1993) Hawaii
Rhode Island (1995) Maine
New Hampshire (1997) Maryland
Nevada (1999) Massachusetts
District of Columbia Michigan
Maryland (2001) Nevada
New York (2002) New Hampshire












Cohabiting % to Support
Diff. Sex Evangelical Legal Gay Overall
State Couples Adherents Sex Score
Alabama 5.3% 40.6% 39.6 0
Alaska 11.7% 12.5% 69.0 3
Arizona 9.7% 9.5% 69.6 3
Arkansas 6.0% 43.1% 47.6 0
California 9.1% 7.2% 73.2 3
Colorado 8.6% 10.6% 73.6 3
Connecticut 8.3% 2.4% 78.8 3
Delaware 9.7% 5.2% 63.1 3
Florida 9.3% 14.0% 63.1 3
Georgia 7.5% 27.8% 54.7 0
Hawaii 8.9% 8.1% 84.1 3
Idaho 7.0% 9.0% 57.0 1
Illinois 7.7% 10.3% 66.8 2
Indiana 8.4% 16.0% 57.0 1
Iowa 7.7% 11.7% 66.0 2
Kansas 6.3% 15.6% 64.2 1
Kentucky 7.0% 33.7% 43.6 0
Louisiana 8.5% 21.5% 55.3 1
Maine 11.2% 3.3% 65.7 3
Maryland 9.1% 7.7% 70.4 3
Massachusetts 8.7% 2.4% 76.6 3
Michigan 8.8% 10.8% 63.6 3
Minnesota 8.2% 11.1% 67.3 2
Mississippi 7.5% 39.7% 42.8 0
Missouri 8.2% 24.7% 60.1 0
Montana 8.0% 11.2% 67.7 2
Nebraska 7.0% 14.6% 64.7 1
Nevada 11.6% 5.4% 76.2 3
New Hampshire 10.2% 2.4% 74.6 3
New Jersey 7.6% 2.4% 72.3 2
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New Mexico 10.3% 13.1% 54.8 2
New York 9.1% 2.9% 72.9 3
North Carolina 7.2% 25.6% 51.0 0
North Dakota 7.2% 9.7% 57.5 1
Ohio 8.4% 10.0% 60.0 2
Oklahoma 6.2% 41.5% 50.4 0
Oregon 9.9% 11.4% 73.2 3
Pennsylvania 8.1% 5.7% 64.6 2
Rhode Island 9.5% 1.6% 72.9 3
South Carolina 7.4% 29.4% 55.1 0
South Dakota 7.7% 13.8% 59.7 1
Tennessee 6.7% 37.0% 45.2 0
Texas 6.7% 24.4% 55.4 0
Utah 4.5% 1.9% 55.7 1
Vermont 11.3% 2.4% 77.9 3
Virginia 7.3% 17.1% 62.0 0
Washington 9.5% 9.8% 68.1 3
West Virginia 7.4% 11.1% 46.8 1
Wisconsin 9.0% 12.7% 65.4 3
Wyoming 8.3% 11.4% 65.7 2
Average 8.3% 14.5% 62.9 1
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